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I. Introduction
On May 10, 2006, USA Today revealed an intriguing controversy that
sparked the curiosity of the American public.' According to the report, the
" J.D. Candidate, University of California, Hastings College of the Law, 2008; B.S. University of
Illinois at Champaign-Urbana, 2005. Special thanks to Professor Aaron Rappaport for
contributing feedback to this Note.
HASTINGS COMMIENT L.J.
United States National Security Agency ("NSA") purportedly created its
own call database2 that consisted of consumers' private phone records from
four of the largest telephone companies in the United States: AT&T,
BellSouth, Verizon, and SBC.3  Furthermore, the phone companies'
affiliation with constructing the NSA Call Database could potentially be
illegal under United States law.4
After news of the database became public knowledge, members of
Congress called for a Federal Communications Commission ("FCC")
investigation to determine whether those companies broke the law.5
Following internal disagreement among its representatives, the FCC
ultimately declined to investigate or impose regulations on the
telecommunications providers due to the "classified nature of the [NSA
Call Database]." 6 Specifically, the commission claimed that disclosing any
information would "cause exceptionally grave damage to the national
security of the United States."7 In turn, the FCC's refusal to involve itself
in this matter has led to much criticism by the government and public
alike.8
If the FCC is the government agency directly in charge of regulating
all facets of citizens' communication, why did they decline to look into this
potential breach of consumer privacy? At the same time, is an FCC
investigation necessary to determine potential issues of legality concerning
the NSA Call Database, as opposed to leaving the matter strictly for the
U.S. federal courts? This note will outline and analyze the substantive law
and policy regarding the FCC's role regarding the NSA Call Database. The
NSA Call Database could potentially affect hundreds of millions of U.S.
citizens' expectation of privacy, civil rights, and ability to rely on the
government. Overall, the legal authority and policy tend to favor the need
for the FCC, as an overriding authority in telecommunications law with
special expertise, to investigate the matter on behalf of Verizon, AT&T,
1. Leslie Cauley, NSA Has Massive Database of Americans' Phone Calls, USA TODAY,
http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/2006-05- 10-nsa-x.htm (last visited Mar. 6, 2008).
2. Id.
3. Id
4. Id.
5. Press Release, Congressman Ed Markey, FCC Refuses to Investigate NSA Program,
Predicting Likely Administration Road Blocks (May 23, 2006),
http://markey.house.gov/index.php?option=content&task=view&id= 1610&ltemid = 12.
6. William M. Welch, NSA Secrecy Makes Investigation Impossible, FCC Says, USA
TODAY, http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/2006-05-23-fcc-nsax.htm (last visited Mar.
6, 2008).
7. Id.
8. Id.
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SBC, and BellSouth's consumers regarding this potentially immense
breach of consumer privacy.
II. Overview and History
A proper analysis of the NSA Call Database necessitates a general
overview of the purpose and structure of the two affected governmental
agencies: the National Security Agency and the Federal Communications
Commission. Further, a brief history of the NSA Call Database is also
necessary to appropriately comprehend the controversy it has caused.
A. Government Agencies
1. The National Security Agency (NSA)
The National Security Agency officially formed in November of
1952. 9 As part of the Department of Defense,' 0 the agency is primarily
responsible for collecting and analyzing foreign communications."' To
promote the goal of national safety,12 President George W. Bush authorized
the NSA to eavesdrop on various forms of communication, including radio
broadcasting by organizations and individuals, the Internet, telephone calls,
and any other readily obtainable means. 13 Since the NSA operates both
internationally and domestically, 4 their activities have the potential to
invade U.S. citizens' privacy.
15
According to Executive Order 12333,16 the NSA's charter, 17 the
agency can exert efforts to obtain information that it deems to be "foreign
intelligence or counterintelligence,"' 8 but it cannot "[acquire] information
9. National Security Agency, Introduction to History, http://www.nsa.gov/history/
index.cfin (last visited Mar. 6, 2008).
10. National Security Agency, Introduction to NSA/CSS, http://www.nsa.gov/about/
index.cfn (last visited Mar. 6, 2008).
11. National Security Agency, Mission Statement, http://www.nsa.gov/about/
about0003.cfm (last visited Mar. 6, 2008).
12. Id.
13. See Peter Baker, President Acknowledges Approving Secretive Eavesdropping: Bush
Also Urges Congress to Extend Patriot Act, WASHINGTON POST, Dec. 18, 2005, at AOl,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2005/12/17/ AR2005121700456_pf.html.
14. National Security Agency, Frequently Asked Questions - About NSA,
http://www.nsa.gov/about/about00018.cfm (last visited Mar. 6, 2008).
15. See Baker, supra note 13.
16. National Security Agency, Executive Order 12333 - United States intelligence
Activities, Dec. 4, 1981, http://www.reagan.utexas.edu/archives/speeches/1981/120481 d.htm (last
visited Mar. 6, 2008).
17. Id. at 1.8.
18. Id. at 1.8(a).
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concerning the domestic activities of United States persons."19
Traditionally, the NSA relied on the FBI to collect information on foreign
intelligence activities within the United States.2° Further, the NSA's
activities are meant to focus on "embassies and missions of foreign
,,21nations.
2. The Federal Communications Commission (FCC)
The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) is an independent
government agency that reports directly to Congress.22 Congressional Title
47 U.S.C. §§ 151 and 154 outline the commission's structure and duties.23
Generally, the FCC regulates interstate and international broadcasting
(radio and television), interstate telecommunications (wire, satellite, and
cable), and all international communications that begin or end in the United
States.24 As a whole, the Bureau's responsibilities include processing
applications for licenses and other filings; analyzing complaints,
conducting investigations, developing and implementing regulatory
programs, and taking part in hearings.2  With regard to potential
misconduct in the sale of phone records, the Enforcement Bureau would be
in charge of enforcing FCC rules, orders, and the provisions of the 1934
Communications Act.26  Specifically, major areas that the Enforcement
Bureau handles are homeland security, local competition, public safety,
and, importantly, consumer privacy and protection.27
B. The NSA Call Database
In the Southern District of New York's case Mcmurray v. Verizon
28clietCommunications Inc., attorneys claimed that the NSA began to construct
a phone record database as early as seven months prior to the September
11, 2001, terrorist attacks.29 In full, the database has an estimated 1.9
19. Id. at 1.8(d).
20. Id.
21. Id. at 1.8(c).
22. Federal Communications Commission, About the FCC,
http://www.fcc.gov/aboutus.html (last visited Mar. 6, 2008).
23. 47 U.S.C §§ 151 and 154 (2000).
24. See Federal Communications Commission, supra note 22.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Andrew Harris, Spy Agency Sought U.S. Call Records before 9/11, Lawyers say,
BLOOMBERG, June 30, 2006, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601087&sid =
ablV0cO64zJE&refer.
29. Id.
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trillion call-detail records, 30 and is quite possibly the "largest database ever
assembled in the world.' The U.S. government's use of this supposed
database, however, is unknown.32 Nonetheless, the database is likely
linked to the "Terrorist Surveillance Program," which is a highly
controversial NSA program that permits warrantless electronic surveillance
on phone calls and other forms of communication that are linked to
suspected terrorists and affiliates of Al Qaeda.33 Unlike the Terrorist
Surveillance Program, however, the Bush administration has neither
confirmed nor denied the existence of this domestic call-record database.34
Government officials have criticized and disagreed with the NSA Call
Database. For example, Rep. Edward Markey of the U.S. House of
Representatives and the Seventh District of Massachusetts 35 stated,
[t]he FCC, which oversees the protection of consumer privacy under
the Communications Act of 1934, has taken a pass at investigating
what is estimated to be the nation's largest violation of consumer
privacy ever to occur. If the oversight body that monitors our nation's
communications is stepping aside[,] then Congress must step in. 3 6
On the other hand, FCC Chair Kevin Martin stated that White House
Director of National Intelligence, John Negroponte, and NSA Lieutenant
General Keith B. Alexander had warned him that, "disclosing information
[in and of itself] about the alleged relationship between AT&T [and other
phone companies] and the NSA could hurt national security." 37  As a
whole, the conflict and general disagreement about the NSA Call Database
deal with whether the government can enforce national security in light of
American individuals' guaranteed right to privacy.
As a result of this alleged conspiracy with the NSA, the phone
companies publicly responded in contradictory and somewhat vague press
30. Democracy Now, Three Major Telecom Companies Help US Government Spy On
Millions of Americans, May 12, 2006, http://www.democracynow.org/article.pl?sid=
06/05/12/1353225.
31. Cauley, supra note 1.
32. See id.
33. See Press Release, The White House, Setting the Record Straight: Democrats Continue
to Attack Terrorist Surveillance Program (Jan. 22, 2006)
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/01/20060122.html.
34. BBC News, Doubts Over US Phone Firms Data, July, 1, 2006,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/5135458.stm.
35. Congressman Edward Markey - Homepage, http://markey.house.gov (last visited Mar.
6, 2008).
36. FCC Refuses to Investigate NSA Program, Predicting Likely Administration Road
Blocks, supra note 5.
37. Matthew Lasar, Markey Criticizes FCC Chair for Refusing to Open Investigation on
NSA/Phone Records Case, March 23, 2006, http://www.lasarletter.net/drupal/node/96.
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releases. AT&T representatives, for example, openly admitted that,
"whatever [they] did, the government told [them] to."'38  Verizon and
BellSouth spokesmen, on the other hand, initially denied involvement in
creating the NSA Call Database.39 Soon afterward, however, Verizon
released an additional, subsequent public statement where they refused to
either confirm or deny a relationship with the NSA.4 °
The NSA Call Database may or may not be legal, and thus far the
matter remains unresolved. The existence, use, and production of the
database could violate various provisions of federal law such as the
Communications Act of 1934,41 Communications Assistance Law
Enforcement Act,42  and Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act.43
Furthermore, a number of federal districts have dealt with claims involving
this issue,4 but precedent thus far is inconclusive. Thus, controversy
surrounds the NSA Call Database, which directly affects American
consumers and the public alike. Several issues therefore remain
unanswered as to what the primary legal authority should regulate the
program, as well as who should appropriately step in and make decisions
on its legality.
III. Analysis: The FCC vs. The Courts
With so many legal issues seemingly left unaddressed, the two main
potential sources to resolve the NSA Call Database controversy are the
FCC and the United States Federal Court system. On one hand, the FCC,
according to its bylaws, must investigate and correspondingly regulate
potential and actual breaches in consumer privacy.45 At the same time,
however, the U.S. Federal Courts have historically possessed the role and
duty to resolve constitutional cases or controversies, and "say what the law
is."' 4 6 Furthermore, the main issues here seem to deal with interpreting the
United States Constitution, which is perhaps better suited for specific, case-
38. Press Release, Electronic Frontier Foundation, EFF Sues AT&T to Stop Illegal
Surveillance, Jan. 31, 2006, http://www.eff.org/press/archives/2006/01/31.
39. Assoc. Press, Verizon Says It Didn't Give NSA Phone Records, MSNBC.com, May 17,
2006, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/12821609/.
40. News Release, Verizon Issues Statement on NSA and Privacy Protection (May 12,
2006), http://newscenter.verizon.com/press-releases/verizon/2006/page.jsp?item ID=29670741.
41. See generally 47 U.S.C. § 151 (2000).
42. Id. §§ 1001-1002.
43. See generally 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1811, 1821-29, 1841-46, and 1861-62 (2000).
44. See, e.g., ACLU v. NSA/Central Sec. Serv., 438 F. Supp. 2d 754, 754 (E.D. Mich.
2006); see Mayer, Afran et al v. Verizon Commc'n, Inc., Complaint, http://cryptome. org/mayer-
016.pdf (last visited April 3, 2008).
45. Federal Communications Commission, supra note 22.
46. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803).
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by-case, in-court judicial decisions rather than an overarching FCC
investigation and corresponding regulations.
The question remains as to why, or if, a broad FCC investigation is the
best means to determine whether the phone companies broke the law, while
the primary alternative is to allow individually affected plaintiffs to bring
forth piecemeal cases in the U.S. Federal Court System. The remainder of
this note will outline, compare, and contrast the FCC's ability to investigate
and regulate the NSA Call Database controversy, with the Federal Courts'
competence and duty to decide the matter. In the end, the FCC not only
has the duty to investigate, but the expertise, discretion, and proper tools to
optimally address the issue. The Commission should thus commence an
investigation on behalf of Verizon, BellSouth, AT&T, and SBC's
consumers.
A. Federal Law and the NSA Call Database
1. The Communications Act of 1934
The Communications Act of 1934, a United States Federal law, was
enacted on June 19, 193447 and codified as Chapter 5 of Title 47 of the
United States Code.48 On January 3, 1996, the 104th Congress of the
United States amended the Communications Act of 1934 with the
Telecommunications Act of 1996,49 which governs a large part of the
telecommunications industry today.50  The main purpose of the
Communications Act of 1934 (as amended) was to regulate interstate and
foreign communications by wire, radio, and other means. 1 One of the
many important components of the Act is section 222-the Privacy of
Customer Information-which states that the FCC ought to enforce
consumer privacy as a top priority.5 2
Section 222 of Title 47 of the United States Code contains detailed
provisions that are meant to protect U.S. consumers' rights, including their
right to privacy.53 For example, section 222(a) expressly states that
"[e]very telecommunications carrier has a duty to protect the
confidentiality or proprietary information of, and relating to, other
telecommunication carriers, equipment manufacturers, and customers,
47. Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. §§ 151 et seq., 609 (2000).
48. Id.
49. Telecommunications Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C. § 251 et seq. (2000), Pub. L. 104-104, 110
Stat. 56 (1996), available at http://www.fcc.gov/telecom.htinl (last visited Mar. 6, 2008).
50. Id.
51. 47 U.S.C. § 151 (2000).
52. Id. § 222.
53. Id.
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including telecommunication carriers reselling telecommunications
services provided by a telecommunications carrier. '' 54 Unless required by
law or through express consent of a customer, a telecommunications carrier
is obligated to only use, disclose, or permit access to proprietary network
information to serve customers or publish public directories. 55
Regarding aggregate consumer information, such data can only be
released to other carriers or persons on "reasonable and nondiscriminatory
terms," or by "reasonable request. '56 Nonetheless, a telecommunications
carrier may use the information to bill their customers, protect its own
rights and property,57 and protect the consumers themselves from
"fraudulent, abusive, or unlawful use of, or subscription to, such
services. ' ,58  The Act also sets forth appropriate use of consumer
information within databases. 59 Specifically, section 227(c)(3) focuses on
the improper use of consumer telephone numbers in databases for purposes
of solicitation. 60  Furthermore, consumers have the right to opt out of
databases without charge, with privacy interests as the primary focus.
6 1
The NSA Call Database potentially violates the 1934 Communications
Act. Mainly, the four major telephone companies might have compromised
section 222,62 or the privacy of customer information due to their
involvement with the NSA call database. The unresolved issues include
whether the means by which the companies provided or sold the telephone
records was necessary, reasonable, nondiscriminatory, fraudulent,
improper, or abusive.
2. The Communications Assistance Law Enforcement Act (CALEA)
Congress passed the Communications Assistance Law Enforcement
Act (CALEA) on October 25, 1994, and it became a valid amendment to
the United States Code on January 1, 1995.63 Congress passed CALEA to
assist law enforcement in citizen surveillance through digital telephone
networks. 64 Specifically, the Act required telephone service providers to
54. Id. § 222(a).
55. Id. § 222(c)(1).
56. Id. § 222(c)(3).
57. Id. § 222(d)(1)-(2).
58. Id. § 222(d)(2).
59. Id. § 222(e)
60. Id. § 227(c)(3).
61. Id § 227(c)(3)(C).
62. Cauley, supra note 1.
63. Federal Communications Commission, Communications Assistance for Law
Enforcement Act (CALEA), http://www.fcc.gov/calea (last visited June 23, 2007); see also 47
U.S.C. § 1001 et seq. (2000).
64. Id.
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allow law enforcement agencies to tap into telephone conversations and
retrieve call detail records, while making it impossible for individual
citizens to detect such activity.65 In its own words, CALEA was meant to
"amend title 18, United States Code, to make clear a telecommunication
carrier's duty to cooperate in the interception of communications for Law
Enforcement purposes, and for other purposes.
66
Like the Communications Act of 1934, CALEA also relates to the
NSA Call Database. AT&T, Bellsouth, Verizon, and SBC allegedly
provided the National Security Agency with their consumers' private
records. Furthermore, the purpose and use of the database is currently
unknown. Questions therefore remain as to whether Congress intended to
include the NSA as a "law enforcement agency" under CALEA, and
whether the NSA's use (presumably for national security alongside the
Terrorist Surveillance Program) is part of what Congress intended to
address when it amended Title 47.
3. The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act
The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act ("FISA") of 1978 puts forth
procedures regarding the physical and electronic surveillance of
intelligence information between "foreign power[s]. 67 FISA is codified in
50 U.S.C. §§1801_1811,68 1821-29,69 1841-46, 70 and 1861-62,71 but was
amended by the USA Patriot Act of 200172 to include terrorism for groups
that are not specifically supported by a foreign government.73 For most
purposes, "foreign powers" include a foreign government, any of its
constituents that are not substantially composed of U.S. persons, any entity
that a foreign government controls or directs, groups that engage in
international terrorism, and foreign political organizations.74
The President, through the Attorney General, can approve electronic
surveillance without a court order only if it is between foreign powers and
has no substantial likelihood to interfere with a United States resident's
privacy.75 In turn, the FISA provisions that set forth guidelines and
65. Id.
66. H.R. 4922, 103rd Cong., 2d Sess. (1994), available at http://www.epic.org/privacy/
wiretap/calea/caleajlaw.html (last visited Mar. 25, 2008).
67. 50 U.S.C. §1801(a), (f) (1994).
68. See 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1811 (1994).
69. See 50 U.S.C. §§ 1821-1829.
70. See 50 U.S.C. §§ 1841-1846.
71. See 50 U.S.C. §§ 1861-1863.
72. See 50 U.S.C. § 1801(a)(1).
73. Id.
74. 50 U.S.C. § 1801(a)(1)-(3), (4)-(5).
75. Id. § 1802(a)(1)-(3).
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authorize electronic surveillance or physical searches without a court order
specifically exclude this application to international terrorist groups.
7 6
Therefore, under the requirements of FISA, warrants are absolutely
necessary to gather intelligence information with respect to terrorism or
national security. 7 Such warrants are either granted or denied, ex parte
and non-adversarial, by the United States Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Court.
78
The NSA Call Database triggers FISA because the NSA gathered U.S.
residents' private information without an official court order. FISA permits
the government to survey intelligence information from foreign sources for
purposes of terrorism or national security. 79 However, the NSA's actions
are challengeable because Verizon, AT&T, BellSouth, and SBC provided
domestic call-records, which most likely do not qualify as foreign
intelligence information within the ambit of FISA. Even if the NSA
acquired these records for the purpose of combating terrorism, FISA states
that court orders are necessary if the manner of collection invades privacy.
The NSA Call Database therefore puts this expectation of privacy at issue.
4. Federal Law: Applied
Due to the potential violations of the Communications Act of 1934,
CALEA, and FISA, the FCC would have to investigate the matter, or the
affected consumers of the phone companies' actions could pursue litigation
for the federal courts to declare legal conclusions and rules on the matter.
Overall, four factors determine whether courts or government agencies set
forth legal authority. Those factors are: "1) whether the question at issue is
within the conventional experience of judges or whether it involves
technical or policy considerations within the agency's particular field of
expertise, 2) whether the question at issue is peculiarly within the agency's
discretion, 3) whether there exists a substantial danger of inconsistent
rulings, and 4) whether a prior application to the agency [about a proposed
investigation] has been made., 80 All four of these factors favor an FCC
investigation over the federal judicial system's approach to properly assess
the four aforementioned phone companies' involvement with the NSA Call
Database.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. See 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1811 (1994).
80. Nat'l Commc'n Ass'n, Inc. v. Am. Tel. and Tel. Co., 813 F. Supp. 259, 262-63
(S.D.N.Y. 1993) (citing RCA Global Commc'n, Inc. v. Western Union Tel. Co., 521 F. Supp.
998, 1006 (S.D.N.Y. 1981)).
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First, the FCC is the best authority to regulate the NSA Call Database
because this issue falls within the agency's "particular field of expertise.'
As a general rule, government regulatory agencies traditionally have
expertise to deal with "particularized areas of law,, 82 and should therefore
be afforded with "discretionary flexibility." 83  "The Federal
Communications Commission, [for example], is the administrative agency
charged with expert skill and knowledge within the telecommunications
industry. It was established by the Federal Communications Act of 1934,
47 U.S.C. § 151 et seq. (the Act) and pursuant thereto has a broad range of
powers including regulation, investigation, adjudication, and
enforcement.,
84
The FCC, since its inception, has dealt with regulating the
telecommunications industry and would logically have decades of relevant
experience as a result. Unlike federal court judges, FCC representatives
would not evaluate the NSA Call Database through subjective legal
reasoning. Instead, the agency could properly utilize decades of its
representatives' experience, and the results of prior, perhaps similar
telecommunications investigations for a more thorough and complete
analysis. Thus, given the FCC's definitive and historic expertise, the FCC
presumably has a great deal of idiosyncratic knowledge than individual
federal court judges to handle phone companies' potential misconduct, and
any consequent consumer privacy abuses.85  An FCC investigation is
therefore the preferable manner to address the NSA Call Database.
Secondly, the FCC is not only the "expert agency '86 on telephone
company regulation, but it also has vast discretion to regulate the
telecommunications industry as well. Namely, the FCC "is most familiar
with the technical and policy issues governing . . . phone service and is
[therefore] best positioned ... to address [those] questions. 87 Specifically,
the FCC's enforcement bureau has the authority, ability, and resources to
protect consumer rights in the field of telecommunications. 88 Although the
Call Database triggers federal law, the FCC is not limited in its authority to
act in the best interest of preserving the consumers' right to privacy. In
81. Id.
82. Kimberly Dee, Delegation, Deference, and Deregulation: A 3-D Look of Video Dial
Tone, 9 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 817, 834-35 (1995).
83. Id.
84. Unimat, Inc. v. MCI Telecomm. Corp., No. 92-5941, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19320
(E.D. Pa. Dec. 17, 1992).
85. Id.
86. MCI WorldCom Commc'n, Inc. v. Commc'n Network Intl, Inc., No. 01-762, 2001 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 15898, at *15 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 28, 2001).
87. Id.
88. Federal Communications Commission, supra note 22.
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turn, the FCC not only has the duty, responsibility, and expertise to regulate
the phone companies' questionable decisions, but the broad discretion to do
so as well.
Third, the FCC is better equipped than the federal courts to attend to
the NSA Call Database because unlike the courts, the FCC could "provide
a uniform solution" 89 to all parties the database affected. "It would be
impossible for the FCC to fulfill its function of regulating the ... telephone
market if numerous federal district courts also undertake to decide the
substantial questions which directly or indirectly affect the position of the
carriers within the market." 90 Given the FCC's unique ability to potentially
set forth consistency and justice for all the phone companies' individually
affected consumers, it should at least be the first step taken to resolve the
NSA Call Database controversy.
The FCC is not only the more logical choice to resolve the database
debate in terms of judicial efficiency, but the federal court system would
produce inconsistent holdings because it must approach the issue on a
piecemeal basis. The database affected up to 1.9 trillion consumers, and
depending on a particular federal judge's views of national security versus
the individual right to privacy, inconsistent holdings could very well ensue
(much like Edward Markey and Kevin Martin's clashing opinions
discussed earlier). A uniform solution through an FCC investigation,
however, would address affected consumers' general needs at once,
without leaving the legality or constitutionality of the NSA Database in
question by varying, contradictory, or inconsistent holdings. Allowing the
federal courts to deal with these cases one-by-one would merely disrupt
what the FCC is simply better equipped to deal with. An FCC
investigation would fairly, consistently, and uniformly deal with the NSA
Call Database controversy, absent the risk of inconsistent holdings or
remedies that the courts would present. Although the phone companies
could ultimately challenge unfavorable FCC rulings in court, the results of
an FCC investigation would not go unnoticed. The courts could consider
and evaluate the FCC's prior findings and only proceed with litigation as
needed. Either way, the result of an FCC investigation on the NSA Call
Database would be fewer lawsuits and more uniformity.
Finally, an FCC investigation is appropriate because "a prior
application to the agency has been made."9' When news of the NSA Call
89. MCI WorldCom Commc'n, Inc., No. 01-762, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15898, at *15.
90. Id. (citing In re Long Distance Telecomm. Lit., 612 F. Supp. 892, 897 (E.D. Mich.
1985)).
91. National Communications Ass 'n Inc. v. American Telephone and Telegraph Company,
813 F. Supp. 259, 262-63 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (citing RCA Global Communications, Inc. v. Western
Union Tel. Co., 521 F. Supp. 998, 1006 (S.D.N.Y. 1981)).
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Database became public knowledge, Congress initially filed an application
with the FCC to investigate the matter.92 Although the commission
ultimately denied the request, Congress immediately reported the matter to
the FCC before it even considered the courts as a viable solution.93
Therefore, despite the FCC's refusal to intervene with the NSA's activities,
Congress originally presumed that the FCC was indeed the proper entity to
regulate this matter on consumer privacy, not the courts. This requirement
of a "prior application" 94 therefore provides even more weight in favor of
an FCC investigation rather than the federal judicial system. Overall,
because of the FCC's expertise in telecommunications, discretion to
regulate, the threat of inconsistent holdings, and Congress's prior
application, an FCC investigation is the proper method to assess the NSA
Call Database's legality.
Not only is the FCC the best instrument to evaluate the NSA Call
Database under federal law standards, but the sparse case law that is
currently available, pertaining to this database, also demonstrates the
agency's finer position.
B. NSA Wiretapping: Cases
Following the FCC's refusal to attend to the call-record database, a
number of litigants brought suit against the NSA in the federal courts.
95
The cases primarily alleged breaches of individual privacy, and sought
relief against the NSA's Terrorist Surveillance Program and Call Database.
American Civil Liberties Union v. National Security Agency and Mayer,
Afran et al v. Verizon Communications Inc.9 6 were suits filed pertaining to
these programs.
1. American Civil Liberties Union v. National Security Agency (ACLU v. NSA)
American Civil Liberties Union v. National Security Agency (ACLU v.
NSA) was filed on January 17, 2006,97 in the United States District Court,
Eastern District of Michigan.98 The ACLU brought forth the suit on behalf
of itself, the Council on American-Islamic Relations, Greenpeace Inc., the
National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, and five affected
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. See, e.g., ACLU v. NSA/Central Sec. Serv, 438 F. Supp. 2d 754 (E.D. Mich. 2006).
96. See Mayer, Afran et al v. Verizon Commc'n, Inc., Complaint,
http://cryptome.org/mayer-016.pdf (last visited April 3, 2008).
97. ACLU of Northern California: ACLU v. NSA, Jan. 17, 2006, http://www.aclunc.
org/cases/landmark cases/acluv.shtml.
98. ACLUv. NSA, 438 F. Supp. 2d 754.
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individuals against the NSA's "Terrorist Surveillance Program" 99 and the
NSA Call Database. 100 The plaintiffs collectively requested declaratory
judgment and injunctive relief,'01 and argued that the court should find the
programs unconstitutional and against federal law.'0 2
On August 17, 2006, District Court Judge Anna Diggs Taylor held
that the Terrorist Surveillance Program, pertaining to "international
telephone and internet communications of numerous persons and
organizations"' 0 3 within the United States, was unconstitutional and
illegal.'0 4 Therefore, she granted injunctive relief to the plaintiffs, pending
appeal.
0 5
In her 44-page opinion, Judge Diggs Taylor stated that the Terrorist
Surveillance Program was unconstitutional. 0 6  Specifically, the program
violated U.S. citizens' guaranteed constitutional rights protected by the
First Amendment, Fourth Amendment, and the Separation of Powers.'0 7
Further, she held that the surveillance program violated the necessary
statutory guidelines of FISA, which were meant to regulate intelligence
agencies' access to private information. 1°8 However, Judge Diggs Taylor
did not rule on the alleged NSA database of domestic call detail records,'
0 9
citing the States Secrets Privilege." 0
2. Mayer, Afran et al. v. Verizon Communications, Inc.
On May 12, 2006, Carol J. Mayer and Bruce I. Afran, citizens of New
Jersey, brought a class action suit against Verizon, the NSA, and George
W. Bush based on allegations involving Verizon's contributions to the
NSA Call Database."' This case was based upon Verizon violating the
99. Id.
100. ACLU v. NSA Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, available at
http://www.aclu.org/images/nsaspying/assetupload-file13723491.pdf (last visited Jan. 20,
2007).
101. Id.
102. ACLUv. NSA, 438 F. Supp. 2d at 758.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 782.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. ACLU v. NSA, 438 F. Supp. 2d at 782. The Separation of Powers promises that each
branch of the state (executive, legislative, and judicial) has separate and independent powers and
areas of responsibility with the goal of preventing tyranny.
108. ACLUv. NSA, 438 F. Supp. 2d at 782.
109. Id. at 759.
110. Id. The State Secrets Privilege is an evidentiary rule that allows the federal government
to prevent the disclosure of information which is potentially detrimental to national security in
legal proceedings.
111. Mayer, Afran Complaint, supra note 44.
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First Amendment, Fourth Amendment, and the Telecommunications Act of
1996 (the latest amendment to the Communications Act of 1934).l2
Although the purpose of the database is asserted to be for monitoring
terrorist networks and telephone calling patterns, the complaint alleged that
these activities were based on no warrants, no suspicion of terrorist activity,
and no probable cause of criminal activity." 3 Plaintiffs further alleged that
without a proper warrant under FISA or subscriber consent, such activities
are illegal.' "4 President Bush himself was also a named defendant in this
case for violating U.S. Citizens' expectation of privacy in telephone
communications under the First Amendment." 5 The plaintiffs sought
declaratory relief, an injunction, and monetary damages of $1,000 per
violation, which amounted to a minimal collective amount of
$5,000,000,000.1 16 Based on the numbers, Verizon's supposed phone sales
affected at least 5,000,000 class members. As of this note, the presiding
court has yet to render a decision on this case.
3. Wiretapping Cases: Applied
Although a handful of plaintiffs have attempted to seek relief in the
federal court system, the results of ACLU v. NSA and Mayer, Afran et al. v.
Verizon Communications Inc. demonstrate that the NSA Call Database has
not been sufficiently handled. ACLU v. NSA, for example, failed to even
address the NSA Call Database, although it was a primary allegation in the
plaintiff's case. The pending case Mayer, Afran et al. v Verizon
Communications, Inc. is directly on point, and was brought against the
NSA Call Database itself. However, plaintiffs only named Verizon as a
defendant in the action, because they only had a cause of action against the
company that handed over their private phone records. In turn, this leaves
AT&T, BellSouth, and SBC's affiliation with the database uncertain, which
the FCC, however, would address with a proper investigation. Cases
similar to Mayer could be brought one at a time by the other companies'
consumers. However, for the reasons outlined in Section Ill(A), this
approach would simply be far less efficient, effective, and accurate than an
FCC investigation. Considering the vast likelihood of inconsistent
holdings, the FCC's expertise, and the agency's inherent discretion in
regulating matters within the telecommunications sector, an FCC
investigation simply makes sense.
112. Id. at 10.
113. Id. at 13.
114. Id. at 126.
115. Id. at 124.
116. Mayer, Afran Complaint, supra note 44, at 130.
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Importantly, however, federal judges have the well-established,
historic duty to resolve matters concerning American individuals' civil and
constitutional rights.' 17 Judge Diggs Taylor in ACLU v. NSA, for example,
fulfilled this role and held that the Terrorist Surveillance Program was
unconstitutional. 118 However, unlike the Terrorist Surveillance Program,
the NSA Call Database differs from direct conflicts between government
agents and individuals within the United States who assert and defend their
constitutional right to privacy. The NSA Call Database involves large,
powerful, non-governmental third party telecommunications companies
that allegedly sold trillions of phone records held by service providers.
According to the FCC's charter and purpose, oversight of potential
misconduct regarding such breaches in consumer privacy falls directly
within the province of the FCC.' 19
A great deal of inconclusive information thus remains concerning the
NSA Call Database, the companies' involvement, and how the NSA
utilizes this system. However, the heart of the matter that requires FCC
involvement is in determining any potential misconduct by AT&T,
BellSouth, Verizon, or SBC when they allegedly provided information in a
manner that violated consumer privacy. The FCC, as opposed to individual
plaintiffs as litigants, has more significant resources, funding, expertise,
and discretion to evaluate the phone companies' actions than any individual
or plaintiff class could set forth in front of a federal court judge.
Investigations over the United States' communications sector is precisely
what the FCC was created for in 1934, and is funded to do today.
Therefore, an FCC investigation is the most sensible approach in
determining the legality, or lack thereof, of the companies' potential
impropriety.
IV. Conclusion
The FCC is the authority and regulatory agency concerning
telecommunications. Hence, the commission is the proper entity to settle
the debate and make a decision as to whether the NSA Call Database is
constitutional. Although AT&T, BellSouth, Verizon, and SBC might have
assisted the government for the purpose of national security, the FCC is
nonetheless meant to regulate telecommunication carriers to foster
confidentiality and the safe flow of information. To allow the judicial
system to settle this matter without intervention from the FCC would result
in a less effective, less efficient, and therefore impractical approach to
117. See generally47 U.S.C. §151 (2000).
118. See ACLU v. NSA/Central Sec. Serv, 438 F. Supp. 2d 754, 782 (E.D. Mich. 2006).
119. See Federal Communications Commission, supra note 22.
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resolve the consumers' rightful concerns. For that reason, an FCC
investigation is not only the appropriate legal measure to pursue, but it is
also the most sensible step to take. Until then, numerous American
consumers are left waiting.
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